tv Elbridge Colby The Strategy of Denial CSPAN December 29, 2021 4:54pm-5:48pm EST
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>> good afternoon everyone and thank you foran joining us toda, i would to welcome you to our events, the best defense strategy for america and elbridge colby on "the strategy of denial" into the united states be prepared to fight it should they be ready to fight in these fundamental questions ioshould be in the center of any u.s. defense policy but i often skipped over in the questions and like how many ships to be given the navy and until we answer the most fundamental question, answers should be specific question, would they be a valuable and the biden administration is presumably hard work writing the national security strategy the next national defense strategy and then correctly the strategies would help focus the u.s. security apparatus and the most - risk facing the nation at and
particular, specifically never to shape and train imposter united states military. the 2018 national defense strategy that singled a sharp turn the global war on terror, to great power competition and although he came out a few years ago, the u.s. military still raising her making that transition it and no shortage of voices and opinions about what she may be included in america's nash national strategy and annuity and in many ways more consideration and elbridge colby is a long time it think tank scholar, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense, mostly can we delay for the purpose of today's discussion, service and pentagon official development of the 2018, national strategy and is the author of new book, this tuesday, "the strategy of
denial", america's defense and age of great power, competition in the book is right here and will be placed in the information on how you can get your copy the bucket a special publishers discount, and the chat feature of this webinar and so we start out to engage a few questions and then we will turn you the audience, for your questions and there's a way for you to t it have those questions and the feature of the chat box, just go there, submit your question we will take it here we would be delighted to put those questions to elbridge colby said elbridge colby, thank you for joining us today to my thank you so a real pleasure and my honor to be able to talk to you as well. >> so this book, could not of been easy to write, and there's been a ton of research and hundreds upon hundreds of interesting it things you call in the introduction and deductive approach so you did not jump right to the conclusion say here is what elbridge colby thinks, you actually made a case
to explore all the options then come to the conclusion so what was your motivations for writing the book. >> i think the motivation wasat basically, the mismatch that you put your finger on earlier in the remarks between the strategy that we have been pursuing it has been heavily in theaters very high operations and the reality of the geopolitical power infect the military balance especially with b great power that you mentioned china.lly so i think we are in a series of mismatch and we began this transition it but during this period, the strategy is really critical because especially important when you can't sort of like snuggle the problems with resources and i think that's kind of where we were in the less few years. we did this afghanistan iraq and the problems that we might worry
about, and with their overall abundance of power and resources just true in the more correct think the world and there are resources that we have to deal with them and so i think for me, depending on, it would just a wish military career had i believe the armies in strategy and resources division and the strategy and it's easy to come up with a handful of aspirations but strategy what it really is connecting it the dollars and cents in efforts than steaks with a coherent framework and that's what i wanted to lay out here and so your audience for me hundred former military officerk will but also it's really important to me that these really important that our military strategy are different strategy has to be reasonable
because they are potentially thinking about fighting, that could be into war or it could be exactly costly to be bullied by cintuit and hustling and trying to find that in the book, is to a very wide audience. .. the way you with all the various options and narrowed it down to get to your conclusion. a lot of these books people will just give you their conclusions upfront and you don't know why they chose that path i love that part of it. i'm going to jump to a part had some disagreements. >> run right into it. >> in your book you say in order to focus its scarce resources the united states should not size shape or posture its military to deal simultaneously with any other scenario alongside a war with china over taiwan. that raises two questions for me. one, all
we are all federal resources and there's not a limitless supply. we've spent 6% of its gdp and now we are spending 3.4% so the decision ultimately as you know a political one. do you think we will have to have scarce resources and they can only choose one scenario? >> it's a great point and i think it seems like the wave taken in a help others as we try to have a framework of logic so people can see. all the decisions coming out of that even such issues i talk about is whether taiwan is worth defending and i think the reason they have different views even though i think we should based on the fact of the friend mark i
rkthink you could make an argumt in a different direction. as paul puts it these are differences among strategies is a good way of puttinggo it. you're dealing with uncertainty and risk and so forth. in the book i said the argument is there a three primary functions of the need to focus on in light of the fact that the military capability and resources are not sufficient. we need to deny them the ability to ally in the western pacific. it's too sustained at and deter multiplesa actors and that includes not only russia. also china and the lower cost way of doing counterterrorism. those are three cornerstones and those areig the basics and image people think we should spend more on defense in the late for the reasons he laid out the next
scenario would the russia helping nato defense against russia. first i think the threat from russia and europe is much less in asia. russia will not be able to dominate. it would be a very grave disaster really for us and we would not be in the same league as china taken over. europeans are more than capable of defense with some american assistance. and i think they should and i hope we continue to push this on that front and finally i think we need to monitor a defense spending. the paradox of military spending is you want to keep a low for personal reasons. also because we spend too much on defense it can have a
negative impact on economy. on the other hand if you spend too little it would have cost us less in the wrong -- long run. my own view is and certainly given the level of resources that are currently talked about being allocated in the biden administration we have to be laser focused on that one scenario and not caught up inn thinking about other scenarios at the same time. >> let me go back just a little bit because in defense strategies i don't know how to describe it it's a shortcut. if we intend to do that in this particular region we count on our allies to do more. i'm sure you're not surprised you're that kind of thinking in the europe area. what we are finding is most of the european issues are not
spending 2% of gdp despite what would be historic during the trump administration and every tool in the toolbox. you read about the germans. it's just too politically difficult right now so in that context when we talk about military power can the world do a little bit more? first off the europeans many of them are spending more and some of them are spending well over 2%. the scandinavian countries include an sweden are spending more than the brits and in the pandemic having increased spending a good amount. if we narrow the problem the hardest problem is germany who's
been on its responsibilities which is not only damaging. morally wrong and i've said this to them directly so that's one point and there have been progress with nato. the second thing is if this continues with the germans as a become a game of which is to say we are faced with the choice of the american people the decision of our we going to decline from our ability to serve our point geopolitical interests preventing china from dominating the world market because the europeans are being themselves so with defense spending if they will force that choice unless we have to make the right decision. the we have to make the best decision for a just and so forth and the europeans will bear the cost of the risk which is toohe bad.
this is why i think it's really critical that we assure our allies. i think we can be constructive. also be firm and tough. that's a difficult valance and is one of the great bings names we need to think about more goingg forward. if we over reassure allies and tell them every commitment that we will be there we need to be candid. japan for instance has been a sacred item of the japanese political system. now in the race -- we can make progress with the question is whether we can make progress quickly enough. >> i wante to get into the core issues of this c book. you focus on china's best military strategy versus the most if and they are a lot in
this town who say china doesn't want war and they would prefer to achieve a much less kinetic so we should focus efforts on that work. it's the huge cottage industry in this town. why should we focus.s on china's best strategy and what do you think the best military strategy is for them? >> i would say fundamentally the reason is because the best military strategy is the one that's the most gainful for them so the most destructive military strategy they could launch a military attack on us and that would be as we do the same thing to them so it does make sense for that's an issue because if we spend all our money on national defense -- we have to getalse the right level and the likelihood thing there's a little bit of arrogance in there
and the hubris because you'd assumeam they could never beat e americans. people who say the chinese wouldn't start a war remind me the people who said there would never be another depression. that's the very statement in the thinking along those lines becauseat we are unprepared for high military conflict in the critical point is the high and military conflict sounds old-fashioned. there's no better way to core somebody. by definition it's not that dangerous. they don't want to be part of the prc. they don't want to be run by xi jinping and the security police
apparatus metaphorically. china's not going to be able to -- in the china's seriouss about it they need to think about the direct use of military force. >> that is china's best military strategy. sick of being china's best overall strategy it wants to become dominant in asia is what i call the focus in sequential strategy which is basically taking off parts of this coalition and not only the u.s.. japan andnc south korea and australia and taiwan. china's going to pick off the weaker parts of that coalition so the idea that this coalition is just a hollow shell and is going to collapse. china, the truth in what you were saying earlier is china doesn't want to start a huge war like world war ii. once to be the bismarck of the 19th century.
it radically changed the geopolitical map. of europe and in some ways we still live with it. that's what china its best strategy would be. the best military strategy for thinking how do we take down these vulnerable parts of the coalition is a fait accompli. they don't want to start a huge war. they want a small focus for where they created new set of facts on the ground and we end up in the rest of our partners and allies basically decide we are going to live with it. the grander version of what the russians did in crimean the problem is it's a really good strategy in its very possible that we and others might decide to do it. >> there's more a here than jusa facebook post it sounds like.
in the book you talk a lot about allies and i like that discussion because there's a lot more granularity. normally somebody pulls out of winston churchill book. they are very handy. i forget what he said about allies. anyhow many people say the more allies you have the better and you however advised the more nuanced approach talking about a special in the western pacific about howw some alliances could carry along with them and tangle months potential costs. could you give us more more of your thinking on how you think about alliances especially in that neck of the woods. >> i look at alliances the way i look at everything. people like you and i i look at my job is trying to work for the american people and i don't collect the federal paycheck. this should make sense in the strategy or for the american people in an enlightened way
with the positive-sum with others. is a cleaner and just and that's why a tendency especially the lh talk about alliances as it were marriages or some sort of a religious pact. it's more like a long-term business partnership. it should make sense foror both sides. sometimes it needs to t be equitable division by spanner interest and our allies are so great our allies have gotten a great deal and we were willing to go along with that because we had other things we are interested in but it's not going to work anymore. the only way we can balance china and the other threats in the world this is if we all lean and in the way that we are best suited at doing and i think the issue of allies is critical in the pacific in particular because as you said the paradoxr is that we need an anti-hegemonic coalition that's strong enough to be china. if they bring in too many countries we risk getting entangled in a war that's not going to go well and many people
watching have family involved in vietnam and it was a tragedy for us and at the end of the day i think it's fair to say it was not worthco the cost. with all due respect to -- for those who serve their there for we have been able to draw that defense perimeter in a different way we may have still won the war. in since vietnam hovers over my thinking in this book because we need to be tough and we need to be assertive and help others. not go too far and that's a moral commitment to the people's interest. also strategic it is after vietnam almost pulled out of europe entirely. the whole thing could have fallen apart so i think that's really critical and what i think our defense partner which is to say the states were connected to it to trace along with all due respect to a distinguished retired general officer i think strong suit is aerospace maritime warfare and that their
wheelhouse and countries like japan taiwan philippines australia may be in the future the indonesia's of the world we are trying to use a maritime forces and air forces to get there project and sustain military power they. their think we could do a good job especially when the japanese have quite a good navy and air force as well. that's going to be dependent on how much other countries are willing to do. if japan's not willing to step up we may need more and we may have to work with vietnam. what happens if china threatens vietnam? the idea to put a finer point on it is if we can develop a military strategy to allow us to defend those countries we don't have to do crazier things later there will be more costly for us. >> excellent. one of the central themes in your book and you talk about it to the point where you must have gotten tired of writing about
the anti-hegemonic coalition he suggested is perhaps the key to defeating the chinese but can you talk about the dynamics andn how we manage anti-hegemonic coalition? >> yeah. it's basically the idea that china is too strong for us to bounce alone or anybody in the nation. china's half of the total power of asia using conventional metrics like economic size in that kind of thing so standing alone would say japan stand up to china, china will beat them around. so we need countries toat work together but it question is what does that look like? i have to don't have the fixed view of what it will look like. to be clear don't think we necessarily need a nato. a nation nato may be counterproductive because it may involve too much commitment so this is something looser i'm talking about this anti-hegemonic coalition. a country like india were able
to do more and more. india pulls a lot of its own way to not interested in just being a tributary of the united states. my view is we should outsource south asia and empower them. they are going to be other places where we have to have more formal relationships with the alliances. if there t are formal commitmens commitments it's the steel in the spine of thatd coalition lie japan effectively tie one of my view south korea philippines australia. that's the frontline because of the chinese are going to get out they are going to push out through those maritime b approaches and if we can hold them there and speaking of churchill one of my favorite quotes is what he said during world war i i think. he said if we win the decisive battle in the primary theater we can set everything else right again after. again old china to the first island chain orpe thereabouts we can deal with africa south america south asia and we will
be an advantageous decision. if they lose the chain we will fall back and will be weaker and will be in trouble everywhere else. >> i remind the audience to submit your questions. we are taking questions and we will get to those in just a moment here and i would also plug the book again "the strategy of denial" and information on how to get your copy of the handout on the webinar tab. this anti-hegemonic coalition, how would china think about taking that apart? >> yeah exactly. i think of this sort alike short-circuiting the focused sequential strategy is basicall. you don't want to catalyze the whole coalition so you take the germans and the japanese in world war ii was to basically get everyone to fight. you want to have a series of short sharp wars whichin convine everybody that the coalition is not going to work for you particularly because of china goes after taiwan and then maybe
goes after the philippines people are going to get the message to credibility is important a particular way. i think we can get and deal with the ramifications on how to handle the withdrawal from afghanistan. people can tell the difference between afghanistan and say taiwan. if you are in japan though taiwan is a neighbor. i think it's within eyesight.ne iw think you can see it from taiwan and vice versa. this is a much different thing and do the americans basically say well they can do well enough to help taiwan because the chinese are just too strong well how does that apply to japan and? that's what china wants instead of fighting everybody take down a few of these guys and the metric goes around. sometime you will be put on -- under the microscope and it will go poorly for you and the americans will give you a tough game. they will let you do so will be
a better deal. that's a very real possibility. there was a cutting remark about theft ties and he said they've been before the wind blows and it's an expression that applies to pretty much p every country which is they will see where the wind is going in the think they will be left out to dry they will cut a deal. >> as the united states puts its strategies together to deterrence that tack, deterrence theory which i am nott a scholar kind of divides itself into these two thoughts about punishment and more of punishment than an adversary can withstand to get them to deter and deterrence by denial, did denying the object gives and your book especially with its title strategy ofh denial seems to come down fairly strongly in favor of the strategy of denial. can you talk about that? >> denial is better ifti you can get away with it or you could make it work because denial
basically takes the weapon out of the other side's hands are essentially negates power and then the deterrent effect is well you may have owen aral. i've got a perfect shield that you'll never get through so you will never really think it's worth doing. and these aren't mutually exclusive and in fact in the book denial is much better and it's particularly important when you don't have the adage. the problem that they face is where fighting 10,000 miles over there. i want china to be part of its country. the philippines are 100 miles from the philippines -- taiwan. in a vacuum china to care more than we. that's actually we can actually manipulate that and we should really do end up caring more.
the word manipulate is not right. we should plan in a way that puts it on paper. given how far we are talking about most americans probably don't know anybody from taiwan. a strategy s of denial as less f us in terms of our suffering in our sacrifices. denial is about taking the sword out of the other guys handpick punishment strategy usually they don't work as well because people often will resist giving up something they care about even under pressure. also because if you inflict tpunishment on somebody that's one thing at if the other guy doesn't have the ability to do that to you.ri china does in a big way. sure they can use sanctions. they can also launch conventional missile strikes on the homeland and they can launch nuclear strikes on the homeland. they are dramatically expanding their nuclear forces and probably accelerating it. if we start punishing them what
are they going to do? they are going to punish us back. how does that and? is unlikely to be in our favor so the best strategy is to use denial to block the invasion so china's best strategy is to invade taiwan and take it over and create a new reality and tell the coalition falls apart. we can block them from seizing and holding a key territory of our allies. then china has a decision. he can say well i'll give up to fight another day or i can try to escalate this. they could blow up some tankers in the middle east. that probably won't matter for us that much. or they can say launch a nuclear strike in america. we can pose cost back on them. in that content they will be the ones who are wearing what i think of as the burden of escalation. basically they are going to seem like the aggressor and the bad guy and fdr talked about a
righteous might or the flashing sword of anger. that's not going to end well for them either so that mixture of emphasizing denial is the right strategy. for what fundamentally our interests are really important that they are not existential so we can have a strategy that relies on existential risks without again about how we get hethere. >> we are going to go to audience questions next. i want to hit you with one more because i want to make sure you talk about it and that is a linux strategy went and this anti-hegemonic coalition. >> thank you. hopefully this is a more novel aspect of the book. the binding strategy is the ideal q. what do we do if we can't make a focused and i'll workct so the ideal here is that to get face think the chinese fleet shoot down the era maga
and kill or capture the forces and do it in a way that's relatively limited. that's the ideal and that's why i'm so laser focused on it. what if we can't do that? one could be because we are neglecting if our allies don't step up enough like taiwanese and chinese are going to be too strong. that's a reality even if they make a good effort. in that case what happens if they are so strong we either have to wage a much larger war in order to defend taiwan or the philippines or we may even have to recapture them all a world war ii in the pacific which would be the worst outcome. in that case the big question is going to be are we going to have the willpower to do it and that's not obvious because of the points you bring up. what i was alluding to earlier we have to figure out a way
where result we will see it as worth our effort and risk to do it and also our allies and others will see that. basically what we should be doing is our strategy should deliberately be postured in a way that if china wants to apply this best military strategy and focus its sequential strategy they will actually have to basically kick off everybody else and make us all angrier so we'd be willing to do, the things. a concrete example use of this in december of 1941, timbers -- december 61981 the vast amount of americans were completely disinterested in a war with japan and they weren't interested with the war in japan with what happened. two months later after pearl harbor hong kong at 10 singapore
fdr's point about the righteous might we were angry and we were engaged so we want to put the chinese in a position where an order tove even try they will he to start a larger war that means spreading our forces out working with more allies and partners. our posture is less brittle. in a later part of the cold war this is what it was about. hopefully we can look at this. we still fight a conventional war in europe given the size of the soviet bloc forces. that force was strong resilient in capable incredible enough that they knew they would start ath war and that would go to it bigger level.
you reminds me of the nato battalions and poland. they are almost meaningless. the one thing is that every nato nation has a contribution. >> the problem i have with that is the tripwire. in a sense the russians would just ignore it. i think it's got to be enough and resilient more like the forces on the border. these are forces to have to fight through. they will have to blow up a lot of things. then it's more like they can just ignore them or the problem with the tripwire is a presumed the issue which is our resolve and to activate our resolve and
the other example i like to use as third way is lincoln. i think the army did suggest they withdraw their troops. lincoln pejoratively understood intelligently understood. 75,000 volunteers for the federal army. we will go to audience questions >> i think the quote was the only thing worse than going to war with allies is to go to war without them. anyhowfr we have so many coming and i will have to group some things. on taiwan what are the odds of china doing this and what timeframe. it's more of a numbers thing. another one says a questioner
asked it seems to be a holy obsession or a religious thing on the part of beijing to take taiwan so if that kind of commitment keep in mind timeframes and those sorts of things can they outlast that and another questioner said this in china just bluffing? colleagues in taiwan and the taiwanese subgrouping that together. is it a bluff and can we outlast this? >> at think you can answer them all together which i think the chinese want to unify with taiwan. whether they do so will depend on the cost of the risk of doing so. there's a big out of it. what are the costs and the risk. mao tse-tung was upset about taiwan. he didn't have hope of getting past the seventh fleet so i never tried any avoided the
issue in the 1950s and the same thing with shin gel pang. it's the calculus that's critical. the problem is the chinese have been laser focused on this for 25 years and they have a lot of money to put on it. china is a long-term problem. if you don't take care. in the near term they'll never get the long term so both a near tom -- and near-term problem in a long-term problem in the issue is their military modernization programs are coming into force already in right now mistake it. meantime we have been slow toth move. commented the defense strategy and it was the precursor that started the focus and the u.s. built combat but it's going to franco lee to slow for my taste and budget request it seemed to
long-term focused to the long-term is a problem and so this combination of factors makes me think the chinese leadership may do something before 2027. maybe not tomorrow or next year. sometime in the 2020s they are going to say well we are looking good.r who knows what the future holds economically and so forth in china. americans are finally going to act together. their forces won't be where the intel 2030 or after. if you look at why the germans went to war in 1914 and why the germans went to war in 1939 it was often bored this window of opportunity. i think this is why it's critical we focused -- we are where buddhism and near-term as well as a long-term and try to patch together a way that speaks
to back calculus for the good thing we have going is a mackenson island and people don'tph want to go 100 miles ovr the water. the germans couldn't get overcp 26 miles. the second is that the chinese fail after they tried to invade that's catastrophic so they may string of the ccp leadership. the region will say these guys are dangerous if they are willing to use force. that's the worst outcome for etcountry like china is if peope think you're a bad. also you are safely resistant so that means the probability level has to be pretty high so we shouldn't take solace from that. we can do this i think. >> we have a lot coming in here so i'll try to group together for. one in the south china sea was
that the case that china had a fait accompli during the obamail demonstration kind of related to that this sort of thing international arbitration and the philippines won a case against china aboutr intrusions and china didn't care or they went off and did what they wanted to do anyway which would kind of imply they can do these things to achieve their objectives in this business without really going all military. related to that is are you focusing too narrowly on china in this military approach and if it's not a power projection than their implications to the u.s. military. will it shift from active duty large standing to more of the guard resort sort of thing so is it really about war or are you to focus militarily speaking
on china and aren't their implications to that and linked to it is robert gates saying we have never gotten are forecasting our predictions right. are we going down a path where making too many promises has future consequences? >> there's a lot there. let me go in reverse order. with allll due respect he had a fellowship named after him for a number of years and i think he's wrong about that. forecasterca contextual and dependent like the market. accuracy is not the right term. wein were putting down insurance against a potential future which did notbu come to pass. i certainly think we weren't over preparing and the other
thing is the soviets spent a lot of money on the military and likewise semi- overemphasizing? the question is am i over him for sizing the military at the gray zone click the grey zone works very well. chinese basically took literally things that come out of the water. they created new islands. they didn't seize anybody's territory and the intuitive sense. they are on the edge of what essentially was a country in countries like the philippines or in the water. these marginal or ungoverned spaces the chinese are going to be able to graze on their way into seizing the island of rouson and coursing that phillip teen government into ceding to
there will. the reason i focus so much on the military is not that i think war and peace are the most valuable part. we want is peace. if you don't comment a little bit like the police. if you have a neighborhood that doesn't have law and order and it has current forget about commercial development forget about tools because they they are going to want to be there. once you get to that position you don't think about it that much. it's kind of on autopilot. if you lived in new york in the early 1890s you are only thinking about crying. it wasn't a big deal. who thought about the police? similarly if you don't give your deterrence right -- because of paradoxically economic sanctions
don't work. the chinese herb lasting them and the chinese are basically saying stuff it. kudos to our mates down under. paradoxically it increases the allure of military instrument for china. it gets back to if we can get it e so the chinese don't seem advantage in using military force like the soviets never did in europe than we can shift the composition. one thing i worry about the visit administration as they have this tendency to say or imply it's going to a be a political technological push. the gateway to that is making sure the military balance is adequate. as my colleague and good friend matt pottinger put it we have to have a sprint to get to america in the last point on the force
structure i try to make it virtualng about the specifics reserve active guard and these kind of things. by concentrating in a way that you are suggesting at the framework level and i don't pretend to have any of the answers by any stretch. we are better off over focusing because actually we are not over focusing and look you can see china is by far the most -- country in the world. if venezuela gets really frisky or cuba gets really frisky there's not much they can do and b we obvious have forces begin use to call up the guard and reserve the handle base. they aren't going to develop a death ray so we have to make realistic investments based on the biggest risk which is acutely china and russia.
and equitable and more body cam video coalition. i really appreciateee in your bk the second to last chapter was not elbridge colby's strategy for china. we need more acoustically superior submarines. i love that you pull back from that. >> thehe last grouping whether s hegemonic or binding strategy or if we are picking key allies are you in the group were a group and it really comes back to this are you assuring allies or over assuring and making promises. we now have this trilateral agreement between the uk and u.s. and australia with their submarines. if you could kind of go back to this approach to picking and choosing allies and if somebody is not in the club or fewer in
the club you must be really really in port and so you are overpromising in overcommitting. >> it's a great question and one of the harder aspects to think about was his differentiation between this and i a hegemonic coalition. i think vietnam is part of the anti-hegemonic coalition. is sort of like are they behaving in a way love china effectively has to reckon standing up to them and one way or another working with others to do so. meanwhile we put our credibility on the line to defend this country. in effect i would say taiwan is adverse to that. the point is always to think back are we achieving the goal of balancing china and that's
basically our were strong enough together that it they didn't want to go into big war we'd be able to when together. war and violence of if you really want to persuade someone -- if they know they the escalade at the max level and it won't work well for them they will be checked. they won't necessarily be contained and they won't do what we want. they have to respect a degree of our w interests. this is going to be the statecraft and it's where they put creativity and intelligence and where will need to be going for it. i don't promise to have the answers of what thatt looks li. i think the question about over reassuring i think we have gotten into a modeab where we he over reassure allies and we talk about her allies in a romantic
sense almost. we really need to think about the purpose which is to deny china hegemony or any state of hegemony over the key regions. that's also in their interests. it's not falling in love but it's more like a business partnership that's aun sounder basis for ann agreement. people talk about shared values. i love our countrymen sleep. japan has shared values in some ways and not in others and has a different political culture. they are most important ally in the world becausee nobody is strongly -- stronger. that's a rationale. we are in it together whether we like it or not so i think that's how we should think about it and we should mix assurance and pressure. their allies should know they don't step up there's a
possibility we'll deal to do it. i was very encouraged by taiwan's announcement the other day that they will spend a lot more. they are at real risk of being abandoned. i'm for defending taiwan. there a lots of people who quietly or not are saying it's not worthha it. it's likedi 70-30. i think what they did the other day is important and they should continue in that direction. the other thing is we can defend countries in different ways. during the cold war we were going to defend west germany. we like west germany. also west -- western germany have theth strongest economy in their plans depended on what what the west chairman west chairman state. if the west germans sat around and did nothing we would drop out and we told them that. they that. if you want after. they wanted for defense of the border. not incidentally they developed
a robust -- an earlier conversation they can do better and they should do better. one of the things is relations are too good with germany. there should be a lot of tension because we care about europe. this is the way that we need to not vacillate between overly tough and personalizing things on the one hand. reassuring in saying everything is hunky-dory. in a sense the biden administration has tripped up by its own approach on this. i think they deserve a plus for thatat than the french, the freh should have done better with diplomacy obviously.th how surprising is it obviously this kind of thing is going to happen and this is just the beginning. we are only going to get all together in ways that are going to be suited for guard different
alliances if we are candid. and realistic and tip close that's what i try to do in this book is provide a framework how her relationship should evolve i don't know. it's very fallible. i hope we have a framework that allow people to have a more focused discussion. >> this is then wonderful and importantly we are out of time. i'd say we have only scratched theod surface of elbridge colbys book. please don't listen to youtube video and say i've got the book because you do not. does have the thinnest layer of it and i want to thank the audience for joining us here today. if you work on the hill or just have questions please contact us by using the information on the screen. you'll get a survey at the end of this and i hope you fill that out. meanwhile elbridge colby thank you so much and audience members thank you so much for joining us
and we look forward to seeing you again at another heritage event. >> helen raleigh is the epitome of the americant: dream. in commerce turn into came to the u.s. as a college student. she is less than $100 in her pocket. and streams were rich. their combination of hard work and scholarship talent earned her master's degree in business economics from the state university of new york and the university of wyoming. she's the author of several books includ