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tv   U.S. War Against Japan 1944-1945  CSPAN  January 5, 2019 10:35pm-11:57pm EST

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supreme court and events in washington, d.c. and around the country. c-span is brought to you by our cable or satellite provider. >> next, villanova history professor, marc gallicchio talks about his book, "implacable foes: war in the , cific, 1944 to 1945" co-authored with world war ii veteran waldo heinrichs. the book won the 2018 bohn kroft prize for history and diplomacy and examines grad strategy as well as the experience of the common soldier during the final bloody months of the wear. hosted york symposium this 80-minute event. , a history icchio professor and chair of the history department at villanova university. he holds a b.a. from temple
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university, and m.a. from pennsylvania state university .dp from temple. he he is author of several weeks on american-east asian relations, and the encounter asianism in lack america 1890-1945. fascinating. that book won the society of historians of american foreign relations robert h. ferrow prize. his most recent book, co-authored with his mentor, waldo heinrichs, "implacable foes: war in the pacific, 1944 this was awarded the 2018 bancroft prize in history and diplomacy. please welcome dr. marc
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gallicchio. [applause] >> thank you, bob. i want to thank bob and the members for inviting me here today. thank you all no coming out. it's a real honor to be speaking to this group. tonight i would like to talk about the final months of the pacific war following the surrender of germany in may of 1945. the title of this talk is intended to convey the connection between the strategy the u.s. pursued in the war, the rise of war wearyness on the home front, and the impact that that domestic discontent add on america's ability to achieve its objectives in the war. war wearyness was more than a generalized mood of public tiredness with the war. during the spring and summer of 1945, war wearyness was manifested in specific actions and policies that had the
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potential to undermine american strategy and war aims. there is my thesis. there is the paint of the talk. >> as with any narrative, once you decide where you want to begin, you also have to decide what the reader or the listeners need to know in advance in order to make sense of what is coming. so i am going to step back for a second and start with american strategy. the u.s. strategy for global war was predicated on general george marshall's well-known action onthat a democracy cannot fight a seven years war. nevertheless, the means chosen to prosecute the war unintentionally impeded the achievement of a timely victory in the pacific. there were a lot of reasons or a lot of factors that criminalitied to that. the most obvious was the europe first strategy that the americans chose, which meant
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that victory in the pacific would have to wait. unconditional surrender was another, the policy of unconditional surrender. a timely conclusion to the war was necessary, but the war had to end in complete victory over the axis. defeat had to be total. this would prove to be one of the more controversial policies of the war, but at the time it was announced, it was widely accepted by the military and the public as absolutely necessary. the unconditional surrender of japan, the army believed, could only be achieved through an invision of japan's home islands, a strategy of blockade and bombardment, that is a siege, would prolong the war and would likely result in a negotiated surrender, thus undermining the goal of unconditional surrender. so the policy was followed at least as far as the army was
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concerned. another obstacle or embedment to a timely victory had to do with the political concessions that franklin roosevelt made when he mobilized the country for war. to maintain support for the war, the u.s. gambled on mobilized fewer divisions than originally planned. this is the famous 90-division gamble. this would place less strain on the domestic economy, which would serve as the a arsenal of democracy. so a smaller army meant fewer at home in the factories producing goods for the war, but it would also impose fewer restrictions on domestic consumption than otherwise would have been the case and thus encourage greater public support for the war. the u.s. army planned to again, another concession, partial did he mobilization, once germany was defeated. those soldiers who had seen the most action in the mediterranean, europe and the
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pacific, would be send home, while those less experienced would be sent to the pacific to complete the assault on japan. demobilization and redeployment would occur small continue yussly. the discharge of troops and the re-did he employment of perhaps at the same time. europe first, unconditional surrender and concessions to the home front on mobilization were political choices that tipped the scales against the achievement of a timely victory in the pacific. but they had to overcome physical obstacles not of their own making. first was that the american had to conquer distance, waging war n the pacific. wrong one. sorry. there we go.
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let that sink in for a second. give you an idea of the vastness of the pacific theater. a round trip in the pacific theater from the west coast took three times as long -- whoops. all of a sudden, it is very sensitive. took three times as long as the circuit in the atlantic did from the eastern seaboard to europe and back again, thus tying up shipping. climate, terrain and lack of bases were other obstacles that the americans had to overcome. they had to build bases as they went forward. that nent they had to bring the equipment and the manpower necessary to do that, which tied up further shipping in the pacific. then there was the enemy. tenacious, well-led and determined to slow american progress at any cost in order to force a negotiated settlement.
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by early 1944 the u.s. was going on the offensive in the pacific. american advances in the pacific appeared to keep pace with allied progress in europe during this period after the normandy invasion. i will just show you this. you can see these are the list of operations. then we get into 1944 and 1945, and you can see the increase in the action that was taking place. unlike europe, however, individual victories did not result in the large scale surrender of japanese troops, or for that matter the organized surrenderer of japanese troops at all. there were a crew cracks. the closer the americans crew to the home islands, the more difficult the fighting became.
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by early 1945, the united states had reached the doorstep f japan. iwojima in the central pacific, and okinawa. and philippines, landing in that area, resulting in the liberation of manila on march 3rd of that year. one of the controversies that sued from these operations that took place, operations that were taking place in the philippines at the time, this is the 6th army area, and below hat line is the 8th army area. and there has been ever since uestions about why macarthur was awe loued to conduct
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operations to liberate all of the philippines. these operations were costly. they were debilitating to the troops. they depleted the manpower that would be needed for the invision. macarthur said that all the philippines had to be liberated in part for political reasons. but he had also criticized admiral nimitz in the pacific for trying to take all of okinawa instead of the top third for use for air fields and let the japanese come to them. so this seemed to be contradicting himself. what we have argued, and when i say we, i am not using the royal we. i am referring to waldo heinrichs and myself. what we have argued is that general marshall let macarthur conduct these operations because he realized that the harbor at manila could not
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handle all of the troops and equipment necessary to stage for the invasion of japan and that if by conducting these other operations macarthur would be taking control of the smaller port cities in the central philippines that might allow for the staging of individual divisions for the invasion. so there seemed to be some military purpose for that as well. but as i said, these were all debilitating and weakening, sapping the strength of those divisions. all of these operations of course were a prelude to of the invasion of japan, which was intended to take place in two stages. the first would be with the invasion of the southernmost island. here the objective was to really hold the bottom third of the island and to build the air
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fields that would contain the planes that would cover the second operation, which would be the invision of the tokyo area. that would take place in march of 1946, and this would be . vember 1st of 1945 all the troops for the invasion the ushu were already in pacific, coming from the sixth army and marine divisions in the central pacific. many of the troops were going to be the re-deployed troops coming from europe. so that is where things stood in the spring of 1945. and then germany surrendered. that triggered the start of partial demobilization. as i noted, concerns at the ome front contributed to
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implement partial demobilization. the program, which was announced in 1944, was devised with substantial input from g. were i.'s, and it reflected their belief that the rate of discharge should be based on a combination of factors, including an individual's length of service, exposure to combat, military valor and family obligations. the demobilization plan took the novel approach of treating g.i.'s as a political constituency. that is a point made by the hit attorney, michael pearlman. the policy as it turns out was an administrative nightmare. apart from disregarding the overall readiness of units from which the individuals were discharged, the policy with its announcement of a critical score required for discharged, the number of points you needed for discharge, served as an
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incentive in the wrong direction for the men in the pacific and the three million soldiers and airmen in the pacific. you could tell looking at that card when you would be going home. partial demobilization commepsed with ve-day, but so, too, did redeployment. the army and air force's plan to redeploy three million seasonals and airmen to the pacific, combat forces, would go by way of the u.s., where they would spend 30 days on leave. then they would regroup, pick up replacements and put in eight weeks training before heading to the pacific. and the second stage of the invasion of japan. george marshall was not given to hyperbole, but he called re-deployment, quote, the greatest administrative and
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lodge -- and logical problem in the history of the world. brandon summerville, head of supply captured the herculean scope of this effort when he compared the transfer of men and equipment from europe to the pacific to moving all of philadelphia to the philippines. and keep in mind this redid he employment would be taking place simultaneously with partial demobilization. following germany's defeat, with the start of did he mobilization and re-did he employment, the public showed continuing commitment for the war against jar. d support for the army's demobilization scheme.
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the army conducted polls. at the same time, the flood of letters calling for the immediate return of loved ones from europe or discharged from stateside units, the expressions of dismay on the ood letting of iwojima and okinawa, and life after the war revealed an ambivalence in the public that might easily crystallize into more substantial pressure on the government. for americans the growing conviction and the inevitability of japan's defeat, and the horror at its st made the pacific war seem more repugnant and less meaningful than the war against germany. i think that is not what we are used to thinking. we are used to thinking that the american public was insisting on revenge for pearl harbor and for the war crimes, the atrocity that was committed
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during the war. but by early 1945, with the bombing of japanese cities, and as i said, the concern over the rising costs of continuing the war against japan, whatever desire for revenge the americans had, had now been somewhat blunted. they were willing to see japan bombed, but they weren't willing to see the home islands invaded if it was going to be at a very high price. in fact, when pollsters asked the public if they continued to support unconditional surrender, they would say they did. but when they said do you support an invasion of japan that will lead to heavy catities, then the percentage of the public that supported that dropped significantly. as a result, the public focus after ve-day shifted from
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europe to reconversion. that is, economic reconversion. from reconversion -- to reconversion rather than to asia. as americans began the difficult transition to a civilian economy. political, labor, media and corporate elites pressed harder for the elimination of war time regulations in the economy. it was in this transformed etting that the army, the -- that the army became the principle target and scapegoat. this is what really surprised us. marshall had been concerned that there would be a dropping off of morale and enthusiasm for the war once germany was defeated, and it turns out that that happened to be the case. but the other side of that was also a growing criticism of the army itself, which i think was less expected by marshall.
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here is a break-down of some of those criticisms and the reasons for them. why so much antagonism towards the army? there had been this article that appeared in i want to say life magazine, orphans of battle, which talked about the plight of 18-year-old soldiers who just arrived as replacements in the european theater, and they were basically told to keep their socks dry, don't fall asleep on guard duty and of course many of them were killed before their comrades and their unit even got to know their names. there was a tremendous amount of dismay and concern. the public thought these young soldiers wouldn't be put into combat immediately, but they had been. so there was a sense that the army had broken faith with the american public on this issue. there were reports of command failure in the italian
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campaign. then there was the work or fight bill in early 1945 which the war department tried to push through congress and failed to get. basically what they wanted to do was make anyone who left the war industry subject to the draft, sort of compelling them to stay in place, and congress rejected that measure. add to that the break-down of the furlough system, that troops were not being rotated out of combat and certainly not getting any time to come home in the final campaigns of the war, and hostility towards the military caste system as it was called, which would eventually lead to the doolittle board in 1946, which would review a lot of the kind of military protocol and etiquette that the army of sically this
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civilians complained about. so all this led to the public apt phrase aldo's arcs foxhole perspective on the war, favor willie and joe over the so-called brass hats. all of this criticism had been building and was pent-up. shortly after v.e. day, congress handed the army a sting defeat by prohibiting the combat 8-year-olds in before receiving training. marshall opposed that. that defeat, along with things growing in congress and numerous leaks from con congressional hearings that marshall attended led marshall to let it be known that he was thinking of retiring in june of 1945. so he sort of threatened to
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retire. the rumor got out there, put and y friends basically, various senators urged him to stay on. they expressed their confidence in the general, but they didn't stop criticizing the army as it turns out. and then of course contributing to these problems, surprisingly enough was the process of demobilization itself. so the critical score was 85 points when it was announced. this adjusted service rating system was in many ways an eminently fair means of discharging veteran troops and identifying those who should be called on to render further service. it was also an administrative nightmare as i minxed.
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-- as i mentioned. this is what a sample card looked like. you can see -- i don't know if you can read it. they tallied the different points, service credit, overseas credit and additional credit for being overseas, combat credit and parenthood. you got credit for each child up to three. the fourth one didn't get you anything as it turns out. which owusu actually a complaint, -- which was actually one of the complaints by congress. the program was subject to varying interpretation and misinformation and error. fact, dwight eisenhower decided that soldiers who served in both -- in two theaters, mediterranean and europe, would be exempt from
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re-did he employment. he was anticipating the drop in the score to 5 points, so he started to take men out who had 75 points rather than 85. the awarding of battle stars illustrates the hidden difficulties of what would seem like a straight-forward process of honoring combat service. . think i have a picture , and you actual card can see it is filled out. the other one was a sample. those are the battle stars on a campaign ribbon. and you got points for those. the authorization of babel stars was an ongoing process.
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points were calculated and division slated for the pacific were cleared with men of over 85 point. the second division learned days europe,t sailed from that it had been awarded to more campaign credits which qualified for an additional 2700 men for discharge. same problem occurred in the fifth division which lost 600 men. altogether, the belated exempted anstars additional 14,000 men and the european theater from further service. from's a letter in may general thomas handy, who was to deputy chief of staff marshall and he wrote to eisenhower. "it sounds crazy but it is going to be really difficult to keep the war a priority from now on
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in the minds of the american people." then he went on to talk about, he said the awarding of battle stars was already creating a lot of controversy within the service. but now that those battle stars carry with them additional points and an opportunity to get out of service, it's only going to get worse. as a consequence. ok. stimulating a constant churning of manpower within divisions, the points system thread to strip units of their most experienced personnel and leaders on the eve of climactic battles with japan. in addition to that, of course, some of the people who were leaving who had been in service for a long time overseas were the company clerks. knewwere the ones who everything about everybody service. of course, they were gone. which made it harder to find out
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how many points people had. ok. but this whole problem was noticeable in the philippines where already battle weary divisions were seeking to replenish troops lost in securing the islands in those campaigns i talked about. they were getting raw recruits from the u.s. in addition the same unit scheduled for the first phase of the invasion of japan were about to lose as many as 23,000 veterans who'd speculated 85 points or more. general marshall complained "we're losing our first team." the most experienced soldiers, right? although marshall had aimed for fairness in the discharge process he found the army was under fire from critics at home who accuse the breast hat -- brass hats of among other things holding on to soldiers for menial tasks like housekeeping and lawn mowing. senators complained that the discharge process was too
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cumbersome and it should be replaced by a simple first in, first out process. would disregard were person served and whether or not they saw combat. that is why it was regarded is unfair by the soldiers, but congress said this would be similar and -- in administering. why not lower the discharge age from 40? with no concern about the support payments. the soldiers who had families, said, why not let anyone with three or more kids out of the service? these were all issues that were coming up almost as quickly as the demobilization process was underway. he said, the army was having trouble getting to the starting line for the invasion. tojuly, it was struggling organize trained and redeployed troops needed for the invasion. being sentdiers were
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to replace soldiers lost in the battles in the philippines and open our and to fill in for people with high points headed home. the pressure on shipping in both directions created by simultaneous operations of both processes redeployment, and demobilization or discharge, as these pressures mounted, admiral doubted thatz the army would be ready for invasion by november 1. naval operations also saw little chance of alleviating the shortage in shipping. and he un hopefully reminded general marshall that there was an increase in the need for shipping in the pacific " because of the system of point discharges." right. he sort of, he zinged marshall with that. so, the pressure on shipping became overwhelming. the army had insisted that
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redeployment to the pacific would be the top priority, but privately staff officers concluded that the need to quell public criticism meant that in reality demobilization was superceding redeployment. they flipped the priorities. the prospect for depolarization -- de mobilization looked bleak. president truman comfortably stated the army would discharge two million men it within the year of v.e. day. even as the u.s. continue to fight against japan. publicly the army maintains that everything was proceeding as planned, but tis internal -- its internal projections showed that the army was falling behind schedule in getting men out the pacific in time for the invasion. in july, the war department announced it would hold to the two million men target
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but would postpone the total points needed for discharge until december, a month after the invasion. throughout the summer, the army remained committed to demobilization and redeployment despite the lag in shipping and the growing evidence that the lines would trunk not be able to manage the redeployment of troops from the eastern seaboard to the west coast. this was another problem. the railroads had a lot of engineers, trained men and track repairmen had all been drafted into service. and the rail lines were wearing down. and owners were saying they needed the release of those soldiers to repair, especially the trunc lines. that this was vital to war operations that were necessary for the invasion of japan.
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ok. and then there was the issue of economic reconversion that i mentioned. it contributed to antagonism towards the army. when historians studied economic mobilization during the war, they emphasized the battle waged between the new dealers and the pro business republicans in the roosevelt administration. right. this is the subject of bruce catton's account " warlords of washington." it's a major theme in the " magisterial arsenal of world war ii." so, there is this one theme of big business using the opportunity created by the war to sort of move in in washington and he talks about the connections that were made during the war that continue into the post war world between the military and big business, right? what eisenhower would come to
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refer to as the military-industrial complex. ok. thathat's one theme occurred. but as it turns out, big business early was the big winner when it came to supply the military. conclusion, even big business began to assist on the need to begin reconversion to peacetime economy. so, this is the part of the story i think that has been overlooked by historians, that nearly everyone on the homefront was concerned about the lagging pace of economic reconversion. also, congressman, but big business leaders. when to begin economic readjustment had begun in the fall of 1944 when it appears the allies might defeat germany before the end of that year. the failure to cross the rhine stifled that discussion. oferville and undersecretary
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war robert paterson led the opposition to reconversion. the austere principle and unyielding patterson, who was also a practice bureaucratic fighter, was anointed by time magazine as washington's number one warlord. to scotch any talk of reconversion and insisted on regimentation of labor to keep war industries coming. -- humming. i have some pictures of the men. matt somerville. that's robert paterson who would later become secretary of war immediately after the war. patersonoff against were the civilians in charge of mobilization of the economy. the most important official in this group was the newly appointed fred vincent from kentucky.
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there, somewhat grainy photo. theent and the staff of office of what is now called war mobilization and reconversion, they added that "r" to the end in early 1945, grew critical of what they perceived as a army's exorbitant demands on the economy. asked, could the army need as many men to fight the one front war against japan as it did to fight in the pacific and europe? why wasn't the army releasing more men? and doing a quicker? somerville and patterson had answers for that. distance involved in fighting the war in the pacific. the army and navy would be using, make greater use of air power in the war. they needed to employ
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overwhelming force against japan. there was a need for new equipment and supplies for troops entering the new climate. all these reasons are good for the demands that the army continue to make on the economy. what this meant basically is that the army was, was consuming, you know, foodstuffs but also all sorts of materials that might have been used for consumer products on the homefront and with this large army of over eight million men in uniform. all right. under pressure occasionally attersonlle and p yielded on specific items but that only seem to demonstrate there was more fat to trim, right. vinson and his associates insisted that -- a restless public demanded a loosening of wartime restraint and increased
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availability of basic consumer items. for scarce goods was already creating a dangerous inflationary pressure on prices the office of price administration was finding difficult to contain. in early june, president truman announced the internal revenue service would be hiring 10,000 new agents to crack down on tax evaders and black marketeers. that gives you the indication of the existence of a black market. the strains on the economy. vinson and his associates were even more concerned that the war would end before the economy was prepared to handle the flood of soldiers returning home and the workers thrown out of work by the shuttering of war industries. business did not have access to the materials or the manpower
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needed to begin producing goods for the peace time economy. the war was not expected to end soon, but re converters argued that disaster loomed and let's steps were taken medially -- unless steps were taken immediately. conflict spilled over into the conduct of partial demobilization and th 40 of dischargese. -- the wording of discharges. they warned of the railroads that would be needed to move troops across the continent. unless railway workers were given preference in discharge. the threat of coal shortages and the u.s. and europe led to calls for furloughs of miners. patterson would not budge. he refused, he said, to break phrase with a -- break faith with a g.i.'s. he pointed to polls proving he had the support of the soldiers. has a oneson not only
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track mind, complains a solid fuels administrator -- the one track is just a short spur. [laughter] of, gallicchio: it's sort underlying all of this controversy and criticism, i think wsas the structure of the government itself. roosevelt had created a coalition government in world war ii, placing the armed services really in the control of republicans. as i mentioned, bringing big business into the war. into controlling the mobilization for the war. people like secretary of war henry stimson, robert paterson, had a mindset that national service that was based on sacrifice. this is what was expected of people after all in a democracy. on the other hand, it is safe to
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say that patterson and henry stimson had not suffered through the depression the way that many workers had. for millions of americans, the fear of unemployment after the war hovered over them like a dark cloud, especially as victory seemed imminent. raising concerns that jobs in war industries could disappear overnight. people began looking for a safe landing spot. fdr also created a problem. democrats lost their leader. the loss o f a commander-in-chief contribute to the fractious mood on capitol hill. republican song opening to exert leadership over post war issues. robert half from ohio who had led the fight to put resurgence on 18-year-olds in combat, much to the dismay of general marshall, he singled him out for
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complaint in a letter. also, wanted to eliminate the office of crisis administration which was seen as this kind of invasive, annoying agency for a lot of people. new deal sort of like agency created by the war. truman did his best to replace fdr. he placed his fealty to unconditional surrender and he gave his approval to existing military plans. truman quickly came to respect general marshall even though his wartime experience, truman's, had made them skeptical of the other breast h -- brass hat. we know what he thought of macarthur. of sommerville, he said he would give us an economy if he could. so, he was obviously skeptical of a lot of these men in uniform. but not marshall.
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manthe other hand, tru also leaned on fred vinson for advice. he met with vinson regularly and eventually appointed vinson secretary of the treasury. truman did not realize it at first but he would eventually find that marshall and vinson were pulling him into different directions. marshall continued to focus on invasion, while vinson embraced the idea with siege with the freeing up of manpower and materials for the homefront. so, a siege seemed most conducive to the reconversion that vinson wanted to pursue. ok. fear over the cost of victory and worries about the pace of reconversion created a political environment in which public discussion of alternative war a and modification of
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unconditional surrender were no longer taboo. former ambassador to japan, former president herbert hoover. representative on the joint chiefs admiral leahy conservatives, grew, hoover and stimson argued for, um, modification of unconditional surrender. this was an essentially conservative approach to war. the experience of the 1920's with japan, which stimson had but also to some extent grew, and conservative skepticism about government led social change created doubts about the need or the of agassi of -- efficacy of a thorough
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reconstruction of japanese society that would follow. basically the affairs of people like stimson in the 1920 said ben that japan had been a co-op at a partner with the united states. this was a particular, a placid period in american-japanese relations. get back uh, you could to that relationship without having to re-construction up any society from the bottom up, which is what was expected to happen following the policies of unconditional surrender. of course, you have to add to that the concern that they had, these men had, that a protracted war would also benefit the soviet union. ableoviet union would be to take advantage of that, and move into northeast asia. their answer was to tell the
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japanese that the emperor could stay on the throne. they thought that was the one issue that was holding the japanese up from surrendering. he was, after all, mere figurehead, they argued. hoover was rigidly adamant about this. -- was adamant about this. he was convinced this was the case. scrape off the militarist and let the moderates, the people who have run japan in the 20's returned to power. this wasn in many ways a sophisticated view. mistaken about the emperor, but based on knowledge of japan and experience. ote, alsoshould n disdainful of public opinion, which is not surprising, the men who were making this case were all sort of from the various professions, elite professions, and i think stimson was the only
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one who had run for office. he had lost. hoover.her than we know how well he did. but it should be noted that a growing number of citizens were actually coming around to this the president in urging him to compromise with japan. i think it was easier for citizens to sort of write these letters because the do not have to worry about being accused of being appeasers. a lot in power, congress, of republican congressman eventually signed off on this idea of modifying unconditional surrender, but they were wary in approaching the subject, because they did not want to be labeled as appeasers or such. opponents of modifying unconditional surrender argued that the rot in japan system went deeper than the
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militarists. a full scale occupation following unconditional surrender would be necessary to transform japan. they ridiculed the conservatives as emperor worshipers. and said they were playing into the hands of the japanese, onht, by calling modification of unconditional surrender. there's an excellent cartoon that appears in "the washington post" that shows the character of the typical congressman, big belly, floppy hat, carrying a sign saying "we might as well face it. we are going to have to fight the russians sooner or later. on the other side of the street headed in the other direction is a character of the japanese andcer with the glasses protruding teeth. he's got a sign saying something vene " honorable sons of hea
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wait for american and russia to have falling out. this will be a big opportunity for us." the caption is we're both working the same side of the street. so, they sort of identified the cartoonist identified that those people calling for unconditional surrender, they understood a lot of that was animated by this fear of russia as much as anything else. ok. truman, on the other hand, post modification of unconditional surrender, because he believed the emperor was as guilty as hitler and mussolini. that was not quite true. but he had a better appreciation for hirohito's role in the war than did hoover and the others. grew, stimson and the others worked to pressure truman in the issuing a warning to japan, the
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so-called hot stamp reclamation, that would include a promise they could keep the emperor. -- called the pot stem proclamation -- potsdam proclamation. they did this with leaks to the press. in early july as truman headed towards the conference outside churchill and stalin, the public was told to expect him to issue an ultimatum. to japan. as it turns out, of course, clausestruck that promising the japanese they can keep the emperor from the potsdam proclamation and then he issued the warning. so, to recap at this point, growing difficulty with redeployment and replacement of high point men, congressional and public dissatisfaction with demobilization, congressional and administrative frustrating of economicw pace reconversion, all of which was being manifested in anger towards the army and accounts of
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the army's policy. then in the summer of 1945, at the 11th hour, so it would seem, army intelligence was shocked to discover that the enemy had reinforced -- drawing troops from manchuria, north china and raising new divisions at home. which they were not expected to do. and this is one of the intelligence maps. of japaneseoyment strength. by late july, it was clear that the defenders would have a significant numeric advantage over the attackers. the quality of these he troops -- troops was not revealed in the intelligence but there was reason to doubt the were not -- these were not all crack troops.
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nevertheless, the heavy damage -nflicted by, cosan planes - kamakazi planes. to foreshadow what lay aahead. over 26,000 non-battle casualties for the army and marine division scouted for the invasion of japan required extensive infantry replacement and reconstruction of units. and so it went. as truman departed washington for the last summit, congressman, even those friendly like lyndon johnson, called for swift or discharge of troops and relaxation of wartime controls. irateletter s from servicemen filled congressional mail bags, officers and the pentagon tracked the lengthening japanese order of battle. was atjuly, while truman vinson cable the
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president tries to warn that the army's plan for the invasion of japan were impeding reconversion and courting economic catastrophe. board's advisory comprised of leaders in civilian economy prepared for a showdown with the president and the joint chiefs when they returned home. at the same time, the new intelligence about the buildup led the navy to call for a meeting to reevaluate the prospects for invading japan. radio tokyo was present actively -- seductively the softening of unconditional surrender might bring the warlords to the table. american strategy had been thrown in turmoil by the japanese. delay or cancellation of the scheduled invasion seemed possible. the way was open for alternative aims,gies and altered war
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with modification of unconditional surrender and a siege being the most likely choices as opposed to finding new sites for an invasion. the army seems to take it on too much, harboring too many contradictions. it had occupied germany, and discharge too many soldiers, for the invasion -- redeployed millions in the pacific all while maintaining wartime controls, resisted by an increasingly vocal opposition in high places. and then, on august 6, the u.s. exploded. an atomic bomb over her from a. -- hiroshima. a second was detonated on august 9. the japanese indicated a willingness to surrender on august 10. japan agree to surrender on the 14th. so, it happened that the use of
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the atomic bomb touched a growing debate over the war's purpose. and in producing a swift decision where none had seemed secured forhas years the extent to which american strategy had been unhinged by japanese resistance at home. i'll leave it there. [applause] >> thank you. we come to the question of how an electoral democracy that people just get not like now.s we have ongoing wars, but we
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have a volunteer military. so, it -- that takes it out of the political realm. but now, i did research on the army air force pulling units back from europe to go to the pacific. morale was awful. >> yeah. especially in the air force. >> alcoholism, suicide. only infantry the division that was pulled out of europe was the 84th. splitter's?il dr. gallicchio: the 86th, waldo's division. my co-author. morale was, uh, their absolutely awful.
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you also have the issue of the national guardsmen who were called up i 1940. -- in 1940. my father among them. and they just wanted to go home. points system allowed them to go home in great numbers. so you would have a unit with a company clerk who didn't know what an index card was. a problem -- no, i'm up on a soapbox. and i acknowledge the problem. units andmy-air force headquarters in godndo, the, the morale was awful.
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well, it failed as a question. i'm going to let it stand as a comment. and handed off to some more erudite person. >> i have two questions. thatr one, you mentioned general marshall was threatening to resign in 1945? it seems as though that he -- that perhaps he has been making a habit or had been making a habit of that. if it looked like he was not going to get his way, he would threaten to resign. i'm referring to 1948, 1947 where he threatened to resign from the truman administration if israel was established as a state. and the second comment or
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question, you mentioned how men, 18 wanted young years old, that age, not to go into the military or to be pulled out. i was at the vietnam exhibition at the new york historical society, and for political reasons, they instituted the draft because it would be younger people being drafted as opposed to those in the reserves on the national guard. and according to the exhibit, the people in the national guard and reserves were older and more likely to vote. so, if they were sent over to the vietnam, they might be more likely to vote against the administration.
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dr. gallicchio: um, no. other than, the case of the 18-year-old was that they really wanted these soldiers to get more extended training for combat before they were thrown in willy-nilly as replacement. and that was the big issue for them. yeah. >> thank you for your most excellent talk. how widespread was the realization that an invasion of the home island would result in absolutely horrific american casualties? numerically far worse than anything america had suffered before. did make that 85 number, you might be sent to your death, certain death. the first day of the somme all
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over again. you can easily imagine one million dead americans, not captured, not wounded, in the invasion. how did that affect people? dr. gallicchio: well, it was, i think it was widely known. and one of the problems with this announcement that the army the that it would lower critical score in december is that it meant there would be soldiers and marines who could look at their card and see that that on the eve of the invasion they had accumulated enough points to go home, but that lowered score but they would have to go through the invasion first. i can't imagine that's, that would've been good for morale. i can't imagine what that would've felt like for these soldiers. i mean, on the other hand, you know, there were predictions to
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go back to the point you made about morelle. -- morale. army's top the psychologist was quoted as saying he thought there was going to be mass desertion when the troops came back home. and some officers talked about that. there were complaints. the 86th division, they complained when after the bomb was dropped, they thought, ok, they had regrouped and they had headed up to san francisco and they figured, we are not going to go now. the war is over. the next thing they saw was the golden gate bridge and they were headed across the pacific. and so, they were kind of dismayed at that. so,i think some of these concerns may have been exaggerated, but there was definite sort of widespread sense of unease about what lay ahead, there is no question. >> can you talk a little bit about the thinking behind demobilization after germa
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surrendered? was there an overconfidence those troops would not be needed to win the war in the pacific bombr was the atomic factored into that decision even though it had not been done yet? if things did not go well they would have to re-mobilize. dr. gallicchio: well, i think what they concluded was that they would have sufficient manpower for once they redeployed troops. they were continuing to draft, draft calls on a monthly basis. i think they felt that they would have sufficient numbers for the invasion, but there was also this idea that for those people who had fought their way across europe, they had done their service and there ought to be some recognition for the. atat. again, the feeling would be for those people who had been the --in the war longest, they would
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be rewarded by discharge. it served as a political decision as a way of acknowledging service and, um, showing people that you could get out of the service. i don't think the atomic bomb factored into it. i haven't seen that. it seems plausible. marshall certainly was not calculating or counting on the atomic bomb. he believed that the united states had to kind of maintain this full pressure on japan, that any sign of let up or weakening would only convince hey justnese that that t needed to hang on a little bit longer. there, japanese, i mean, one of their main sources of intelligence was reading american newspapers. you can see the americans were reading what japanese diplomats were saying about the mood in
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the, in the united states. and that was, i think, encouraging to the japanese militarists to continue the war. so, yeah. japanese position to surrender, perhaps the more important issue for that was the soviet entry in the invasion of manchuria, which included the soviets mediating -- so, and of course, the fear that well, the soviets could be landing on japan. killing their own czar. so, what are they going to do to the ever? i wonder if you came across about the americans factoring that in? or the soviet entry was going to be part of their planning. dr. gallicchio: well, yeah. they were certainly counting on the russians. in fact, that is one of the
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leaks that upset marshall is that, h e was asked by congress about soviet entry into the war. any speculation about that because we do not want the japanese to attack. then the covers and came out of the meeting and said, we may not need as many troops in uniform because the russians are probably going to come in at some point. marshall blew his stack, understandably. the, you, there is no question soviet entry into the war was a big factor and weighed heavily on the japanese. historians argue which was more important to the atomic bomb -- the soviet entry. i just think you cannot disentangle them. to decide which was most important. i think i would lean towards the atomic bomb. but i mean, they happened in such rapid succession. yeah. i hope that answers your
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question. >> thank you very much. when germany was defeated, americans thought the war was now coming to an end. i say that because there was an attitude on the part of the public, in congress, the politicians, that we were fighting two different wars. one land war and one island war. and the plan is, in the military, and among the politicians, never thought about this whole thing that way. one war was over but the other one was still there. dr. gallicchio: yeah, well, that was, i think marshall had frank capra make these films and one was "two down and one to go." don't forget, there are still japan. certainly there was less attention to the pacific theater. to this day, i think people know a lot more about the wari in
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europe. the historian ron specter made the observation, when they did the revival of south pacific on broadway, one of the set pieces was a map of the pacific, ostensibly meant to be a part of the ammap room. that was really there for the audience so they could get an idea of where everything was they were talking about. you know. yeah. so anyway, i think you are, right. >> thank you. when planning for war, one that only has to win the war, but also the peace. there is a seeing that all -- saying that all wars are bankers war. some historians consider world war ii as an extension of world war i continuation. you said the allies had a policy of totally defeat an unconditional surrender of the axis. to what extent was that driven a the desire to set up
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bretton woods type of economic harry after the war which dexter white was starting to plan from at least 1941, maybe was thato what extent policy driven by a longer-term strategy of winning the peace thereafter by establishing economic system that would be in sensitized -- incentivized warfare? dr. gallicchio: i don't know if the connection was explicit, but i think the understanding was that to create a sort of liberal post war order in which democratic free market societies would thrive, that germany and japan, the sort of fascism and authoritarianism that existed there would have to be uprooted. and democracy, representative government encouraged. so, i think that's, you know,
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what sort of was the animating spirit behind unconditional surrender. there were a couple of reasons for that policy. one was to assure the russians that united states was not going to make a separate peace with the germans. another was that it, you know, the republicans had criticized woodrow wilson at the end of world war i for not assisting on a policy of unconditional surrender. in fact, theodore roosevelt was one of the people most adamant about that. and roosevelt was assistant secretary of the navy then. he certainly remembered that. and unconditional surrender then was also for domestic political politics. it was also intended to assure the liberal public that the united states wasn't going to be negotiating with people like admiral darlan again in north africa. the french general the head of
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the vichy government. i think there were a lot of reasons for the announcement of the policy but certainly the expectation that different kinds of governments were needed to reconstruct the world order. you had to start with japan and germany. >> yeah, i just want to add the fact that the soviets had only taken island, before the end of the war. they wiped out the japanese garrison. they were ready to invade. they were getting ready to invade the northernmost part of japan. but i also want to say i was a grunt -- we had one guy i remember. he re-enlisted to be in the field. he liked being out there. 101sarine in my division t, they were getting replacements, getting ready to ship over, to move over japan. i'm wondering if you look at any
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of the reenlistment ranks. because people, there are guys -- wanted to be and continue with the war. dr. gallicchio: you know who definitely wanted to get into war with japan, drew pearson reported a number of generals wanted to, chief among them general patton. that sort of reinforced this, you know, gap between the officers and the enlisted men, most of whom wanted to go home. it is interesting, there, a guy efield became bon a japanl and eugene, specialist in the foreign service, both of them said at different times there was a poll taken of servicemen in the summer of 1945 that said they the, would like to see
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policy of unconditional surrender changed, that they didn't think it was necessary to oust the emperor. i've never found any evidence of that poll. the only poll i found was one that was conducted on state side soldiers who had, many of them had a cumulative almost enough points to be discharged. and basically they said, they supported the policy of unconditional surrender. but they also said they should be discharged now. they shouldn't have to go to the pacific. so, that's the evidence that i have come across right now. n interesting a question to see what the reenlistment rates were. thank you. to canadiang spoken veterans who were gearing up to for an invasion for the invasion
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in japan, and there was apparently substantial relative to the population of canada, substantial canadian forces involved. you also had australian forces that could be utilized. and you had the british, who were in cbi. weary as they were from extremely bitter fighting. and the british pacific fleet was already on the scene. to what extent were british and commonwealth forces figuring into the equation? dr. gallicchio: well, macarthur didn't really want their help. [laughs] to put it mildly. he thought it would just be an unnecessary complication. the way he viewed it. interestingly, you know, after the war ended almost reallytely this demand,
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up for to bring the boys home -- uproar to bring the boys home began in the united states. also in britain as well, there were, the british government was under two minutes pressure to bring troops home. after japan surrendered. but most of the british troops were going to be used. in the operation to recapture malaysia and singapore. that's what they were being planned for. the southeast asian command, right, which th american said the initialse stood for save england's asian colonies. that's mainly what they were -- yeah. >> i was wondering in, in germany, there was the nuremberg trial. a feverish effort to find nazis and war criminals. correct me if i am wrong, but it did not seem like there was that much intensity in japan to find as many wa criminals liker bird
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who was torturing american troops. things like that. was there a reason for that? or was there not a stomach for that as much as there was in europe? dr. gallicchio: well, i mean, the famous case is -- is tried and executed in the philippines. and tojo. i forget the number. it is a relatively low number of high level japanese officials who were executed. to a certain extent, the big fish was, of course, the emperor. and there the australians, the british and the russians were in in agreement that he should be considered a war criminal and put on trial. it was macarthur who scotched that japanargued would become un governable if
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thy weey were to put the emperon trial. the emperor actually was thinki ng that he would have to step down from the throne and leave it to one of his kin. apparentlyur convinced him not to. at that time. so, yeah, part of this was american policy. macarthur's decision that in order to enact the occupation policies, he would need the cooperation of the japanese. the most egregious example has to do with this unit 731 that operated in manchuria, the biological chemical warfare. and the americans made agreements with the officers in that unit to exempt them from ,rosecution in order to get the whatever information that had
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gotten from the horrific experiments they conducted. and that really is the sort of kind of be on the pale example of that -- beyond the pale example of that. anyway. >> thank you for your interesting presentation. dy question is about at the en youthe war, between the -- said japanese side to surrender -- was there some kind of indirect talks or messages from the united states or the officials, the emperor may be testing -- to surrender? words, some kind of modification of the unconditional surrender? dr. gallicchio: that is a good question. i have not found anything. truman was really adamant about this. he didn't want to make any
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promises about the emperor. but the decision they made, the reply they made to the japanese might have been interpreted as saying that the emperor would remain on the throne, because what they said was, the japanese on august 10 had said somebody to the extent of, we will agree to surrender as long as the prerogatives of the emperor remain in place. and the japan specialists said, those prerogatives are all embracing. you can't allow that to happen. so the response of the americans was, the emperor's ability to exercise his authority will be subject to the supreme commander of allied powers. so, that statement implied that at least in short-term the emperor is going to be there . so, that was kind of an overt communication i think i'm not aware of any back
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channel, that sort of communication. but that may have been sufficient. thank you. >> any idea as to why the japanese -- against the russians? there was a massive buildup there. dr. gallicchio: they did. they were, and americans were watching this right to the japanese diplomatic traffic. they reported on japanese concerns and worrying a bout the buildup and like that was taking place. there really was not very much they could do about it. the japanese government remained, held on to this really misguided belief that they might be able to get the russians to help them negotiate an end to the war. the fact that the russians were not signatories to the potsdam
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proclamation suggested maybe the russians are not going to be involved at least for a little while. so, that might've misled them. but the success of the russian invasion had a lot to do with just russian military skill and their ability to launch this massive offensive on a broad front. yeah. >> thank you very much. [applause] dr. gallicchio: i greatly enjoyed it. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2018] 9] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] >> interested in american history tv? visit our website c-span.org/history. you can view our tv schedule, preview upcoming programs and watch college lectures and archival films and more.
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