Skip to main content

tv   The Presidency Eisenhowers Treasury Defense Secretaries  CSPAN  April 9, 2021 10:39am-11:33am EDT

10:39 am
those stories from her book "sex with presidents". book notes plus a new weekly spod cast from cspan. get all the information about podcasts at up next on the presidency, james worthen talks about president isha sesay's treasuriry and defense secretaries and how their personalities and styles influenced policies. both men brought a business perspective to their cabinet jobs. the dwight d. eisenhower presidential library hosted the event and provided the video. >> welcome to our monthly lunch and learn program. i am so thankful you're here with us today. i'm excited to welcome james
10:40 am
worthen to talk with us today. he's going to talk about a couple of eisenhower administration member that is perhaps we haven't really talked about a lot in the past. so james take it away and tell us about yourself. >> thank you, dawn, thank you samantha. i'm sorry i can't be there today. unfortunately we live in crazy times. so i'm here in california, speaking of where people are from. which is about halfway between los angeles and san francisco. a nice place to be, unless there's a fire going on behind you, which there was a few weeks ago. but i'm fine. and the weather is much better. my name is jim worthen, i'm a native californian. just to summarize, i spent my career at the central intelligence agency after -- after school and that sort of thing. and now, i where american
10:41 am
history with a focus on how personality affects political behavior. since retiring i've written three books on that subject, the one i'll discuss today looks at eisenhower's relationships with two of his more important cabinet members. so one question is, how did i get from the cia to eisenhower? it's quite a story. here's the short version. at the cia i had several jobs but the one i think i enjoyed the most was chief of the soviet -- or the russian leadership division. our job there was to write biographies of russian officials. we'd give these biographies to american diplomats so they would know something about the russians they were dealing with, were they friendly, were they hostile, were they evasive, were
10:42 am
they emotional, were they logical? that sort of thing. so -- so when i left the agency, i had so enjoyed this work i decided i wanted to work in biography even more. and to change from russians to writing about 20th century american political figures. and i especially wanted to do personality assessment, which i had been used to doing at the cia. you think of all the personalities, all the politicians, you know, who had big personalities, and -- which fed into their leadership styles, people like churchill and roosevelt and lyndon johnson of all people. so i decided to write about richard nixon. sort of a -- a beginning, because nixon was not only a californian but he was also an
10:43 am
introvert in an extrovert profession, which is quite a story. so the book is called "the young nixon and his rivals," which you see on your screen. most people don't realize this about nixon, but at one time, he was only the fourth most important republican politician in the state of california. and you see here on your screen some of the ones who were more important, governor earl warren on the right. and senator william nolan on the left. and warren's successor as governor, goodwin knight, second from the left. so this book tells that story. and now you can perhaps see how i got from there to eisenhower. because i became interested in the strange relationship between nixon and eisenhower that played out while nixon was vice president. so i decided to look more
10:44 am
closely at eisenhower. and how he worked with members of his cabinet. so here's the book on the screen, so why humphery and wilson? first, because they were businessmen and one of the subplots in the book was the affinity that ike had for members in the business community. you recall that he had a gang of buddies who he hunted and fished and played bridge with, and they were all businessmen. eisenhower felt more comfortable with businessmen, as many of you know, than he did with other military officers. so the question is why did eisenhower pick humphery and wilson for these jobs? the other reason is not much has been written about humphery
10:45 am
humphery or wilson. this was the only -- this strikes me as interesting. they were the only major figures in the eisenhower administration who did not write memoirs or any kind of recollections of their service. they just went off and retired to their country of states and never looked back. so unfortunately we lack a first person feel for their experiences, but luckily we have the recollections of their colleagues and their subordinates and, of course, the president they both worked for. so who were humphery and wilson? george humphery, who became treasury secretary was the long-time head of a raw materials empire near the great lakes. his picture is coming up here. his main job, before joining the
10:46 am
eisenhower administration, was ceo of a company called m.a. hannah. but if a company had anything to do with other, iron ore or coal or steel, humphery had a hand in it. his great skills were business organization and management. and his specialty was acquiring unprofitable companies and turning them around. he had a razor sharp mind. he was very self-assured. he was charming, he was persuasive. a competitor of his said that watching him in a board room was like the equivalent of a year at harvard business school. you can imagine humphery was a pretty smooth character. by the 1940s, he controlled a variety of enterprises, including the largest coal company in the world, several banks, and all the while keeping such a low profile when he was
10:47 am
chosen at treasury secretary, nobody outside of washington had the faintest idea who he was. so why was he selected? that's a long story, too. but the short version, is that he would bring a business perspective into running the nation's economy. the problem was, he had no experience in government and he was not an economist. being an economist certainly helped in that kind of a job. now, wilson, at the time he was chosen for the cabinet, was much better known. he was president of the largest company of the world, general motors. a picture of him is coming up. actually, this picture of the big three automakers in the 1940s. you see the left, the head of studebaker and on the right
10:48 am
ensel ford, who was running ford motor company at the time, and wilson in the middle. these guys were very important people. and gm, under wilson's leadership, as you probably know, retooled his entire auto assembly line into weapons production. and if it hadn't been for all the weapons that gm produced during the war, the allies might well have not won -- had not been victorious. so he was an important guy who had been on the cover of time and news week by then. so people had a fairly good idea of who wilson was. now he was a very different kind of guy, different executive than george humphery. he had been trained as an engineer. and he kind of had an engineer's way of approaching problems. he was a -- a data collector. he had a hard time making
10:49 am
decisions until he knew all there was to know about the subject. he enjoyed immersing himself in details. and these tendencies would later prove to be a real liability in his next job. why was he selected? mainly because eisenhower wanted the pentagon to be managed well and the thought was that wilson, managing the world's largest company would probably be a good choice. and with his experience in the defense production, he would probably even know something about weapons production. so, to summarize, humphery and wilson were stereotypical businessmen, they were midwestern, they were privileged, had privileged backgrounds, they were very conservative. and they took office with the eisenhower team in march 1953.
10:50 am
let me briefly tell you the challenges they were facing in this job. some realities that are important to keep in mind. as you know, republicans had been out of power for 20 years. almost an entire generation. the country had come through a really trying time, world war ii, depression. now the korean war was going on, and all of these had required lots and lots of money. and truman left eisenhower with an $8 billion budget deficit which eisenhower felt was shockingly high. so it was safe to assume when these guys came into power in 1953 that there would be deep cuts in spending. but it was still not entirely clear what kind of president eisenhower was. he clearly had conservative
10:51 am
instincts, but he was known more for being a war hero than a strong political partisan. as you know, he got upset when anybody suggested that he do something for political reasons. he just wasn't that kind of guy. in fact, he talked frequently about how the best policy on any issue was somewhere near the middle of the road. how many politicians in the last 50 years have you heard say that? pardon me for a second. truman had even told eisenhower back in 1958 that if truman ran for president in 1958 as a democrat, truman could support him. it was really unclear what direction eisenhower would lean when he came into power.
10:52 am
he was no economist, but he had worked on budgets in the army, and he clearly understood balance sheets, and it seemed obvious to him that money coming in had to equal money going out. besides, eisenhower had a belief that deficits were a national security issue. they would lead to inflation and they weakened the economy, and this would make it harder to compete with the russians. so if anything was clear, it was that the new administration would not spend a lot of money on new programs. so even though the policy issues, the focus here is on personality and style. for one thing economic policy is not all that riveting to most people, and second, i'm not really an economist myself, so the book really focuses on the
10:53 am
stylistic aspects of humphrey, eisenhower and wilson. the first question you might ask is how wilson and humphrey adapted to their new environment. you could say that humphrey took official washington by storm. he did a series of interviews with newspapers and all the journalists came away very impressed, and they said so in the papers. one correspondent wrote, you can imagine him going into a frantic board of directors meeting and calling it with a few practical commonsense words. so when ike and his advisers began meeting, everyone agreed that humphrey was by far the smoothest guy in the room. as you know, eisenhower took cabinet government very seriously. early on he was relatively uninformed about domestic policy. so he kind of learned a lot from
10:54 am
hearing the members argue and debate with each other. and the cabinet minutes were fascinating because eisenhower would often play devil's advocate. he would go back and forth all the while learning from all his heavyweights in the room kind of on the job. now, humphrey was a natural in this setting. he always came in totally prepared, and if there was a long debate at the cabinet meeting, he would be the first to suggest a reasonable course of action. so bringing up a picture here of eisenhower and humphrey, these two guys clicked immediately. eisenhower had never met humphrey, interestingly enough, before choosing him, but he liked him immediately.
10:55 am
he was so impressed that within a few months he was inviting humphrey to join his gang for golf and bridge vacations on weekends. one of these cronies of eisenhower, a guy named cliff roberts, later wrote that the remarkable thing about humphrey was he was a terrible golfer and a lousy bridge player. roberts said he had absolutely no golf sense, and they tried to teach him golf and get him all the right equipment, but he never caught on to it. but i and the rest just enjoyed his company to have around, so he must have been a charming man. this closeness to the president was kind of a problem because it gave him a tremendous advantage as an aadvisor.
10:56 am
who knew what these guys had decided in advance, or when he spoke to the president on a given occasion. when humphrey wanted to cut spending, eisenhower was obsessed by it. he challenged every penny spent by the government. so at every cabinet meeting, humphrey would hammer home the message that every department had to stop unnecessary spending. he later told a friend, quote, it just had to come up every day. you had to keep working at it all the time. and humphrey did. any meeting, whatever the subject matter is, he said, you've got to stop -- you've got to hold spending down. it was risky to opposing him openly, because everyone knew that ike also favored spending
10:57 am
cuts. people like john foster dulles were a little bit upset by all this. he didn't like this penny pinching. he felt like winning the cold war, you know, took whatever it took in terms of spending money, but humphrey was a hard guy to dislike, and a hard guy to stay mad at, so humphrey tended to win these battles, and humphrey's anti-spending campaign had eisenhower's full support. now we turn to wilson. and if humphrey's career -- if humphrey's term of office took off like a rocket, by contrast, wilson's beginning in washington did not go well. it was partly a matter of style. he was relatively unpolished, especially for an executive, and he had kind of a hard time finding the right words to
10:58 am
express himself, especially in public. as you know, he barely got through his confirmation hearings because he initially refused to sell his stocks and bonds. i think he had a government salary coming of $22,000 and his annual salary at gm was $600,000 or more. so he was a bit nervous about giving up his money. but in the process, he upset. congressmen with his stubbornness and sometimes his unfortunate choice of words. the other problem was wilson's unorthodox approach to management, which became a problem with the pentagon right from the beginning. wilson was known at gm for his very leisurely style. he never seemed to be in a hurry, whether it was getting
10:59 am
somewhere or making a meeting or making a decision. now he was in charge of an organization with a very different culture. and coming up is a picture of wilson with his military staff. on the left, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, william radford. and then eisenhower and wilson and omar bradley, general bradley, on the right. so these were wilson's new subordinates. and, unfortunately, the pentagon is a top down bureaucracy comprised primarily of army, navy and air force officers who are used to specific orders, not endless bull sessions. so to be effective, it seemed
11:00 am
that wilson would have to adapt to that culture. but he didn't. in fact, the service chief quickly learned to dread a meeting with him late in the day because wilson had no sense of time, and they would probably be there all night. they wanted him to be more crisp and decisive. army officers in particular complained that he didn't really understand the army's needs, the army's requirements. one officer said he was uninformed and determined to remain so. not exactly a compliment. another big problem for wilson was that his boss, eisenhower knew far more about the pentagon than he did. it was almost a no-win situation. so here is where humphrey wilson and eisenhower come together in a struggle that would last for several years.
11:01 am
all of wilson's problems were compounded by humphrey's budget cuts. because in the early 1950s, 70% of federal spending was on defense. so if you're going to cut the budget, it's going to have to be defense spending. so another problem was that eisenhower was just not inclined to believe pentagon arguments to keep its budgets up. as a career army guy, he well knew that money was being wasted at the pentagon. he understood how fiercely parochial the army and navy and air force were, even though he had long encouraged them to think more in terms of the national interest. what bothered him especially was redundancy, the fact that the services were all kind of working on similar capabilities that would overlap and result in
11:02 am
a waste of money. so this meant that eisenhower and humphrey expected wilson to go in the pentagon and knock heads together right at the very beginning. so before wilson had even learned the ins and outs of a complex government agency, he had to come in and shake things up, all the while trying to gain the trust of the admirals and generals who worked for him. as you can imagine, this made him feel just a bit insecure. so he began bothering eisenhower over and over again for meetings, taking up ike's time to go over details until ike would explode, i won't run the pentagon, that's your job. and everyone around eisenhower, from his secretary ann whitman to his brother milton knew that ike's hand holding of wilson was a major time waster for him.
11:03 am
but he had a very generous nature and had a hard time saying no. another problem for wilson was counterpressure from congress. many congressmen thought cutting the military was just not very smart during a cold war. in particular, as time went along, senator stuart sidlington, who was a military secretary, was second-guessing wilson at just about every turn. finally, as if matters could get worse, or needed to get worse, a new policy came along called the new look, which many of you are familiar with, which emphasized nuclear weapons over conventional weapons because they were cheaper. ike and his advisors felt that any confrontation with the
11:04 am
russians would probably escalate into a nuclear exchange, and therefore, large standing armies were just not that necessary. and both ike and humphrey loved the fact that the new look would save a lot of money. so this gave wilson a whole new set of problems, because for one thing, it would destabilize the resource balance among the services. the air force, army and navy had always had kind of an equal share of resources, and now all of a sudden the air force budget would go way up and the army budget would be cut to the bone. so for the next several years, the army fiercely fought the air force and wilson over this issue. and coming up next is a graphic from the famous "washington post" cartoonist back in the '50s and '60s, a man named herb
11:05 am
block, who was probably the political cartoonist in america, the most famous one, which shows wilson coming out of his office and watching the air force and army shooting at each other, and he's saying, not in the corridors, damn it! so this encapsulated the problem that wilson had. now, on the one hand, the army was just protecting itself, but it had some legitimate concerns. they foresaw correctly that the cold war would probably not involve a nuclear war but would play out in the third world where conventional armies would be very important. this seemed obvious to most congressional democrats as well. so for the next few years, this parade of army officers, famous ones like matthew ridgway, world
11:06 am
war ii hero maxwell taylor would testify before congress, they would write books, they would make speeches saying that the new look was folly and that wilson was stupid to be behind it. now, when the army went public over these budget cuts, eisenhower was absolutely furious. nothing made him more angry than that kind of disloyalty. wilson is trying to see both sides of the spending issue, and he occasionally had the temerity to argue the cuts were too extreme. he would sometimes go off message and tell the press, we can't make any more cuts without affecting military readiness, but this made eisenhower even madder. so now you see another cartoon from herb block where you see john foster dulles, the
11:07 am
secretary of state, walking with wilson who looks very downhearted, and he's saying, the trouble with you, charlie, is you say what you think. so things were not happy at all for wilson, and one of the problems was that eisenhower continued to make negative comments about wilson over and over again. he would say things like, he comes in here and sits here and asks me questions about the details of his own job. if he wasn't able to do them, he shouldn't have the job. then he would say, damn it, how did a man as shallow as charlie wilson ever get to be head of general motors? on another occasion he said, i think he considers himself a master of public relations. he seems to have no comprehension of all the embarrassment his remarks can cause.
11:08 am
so this was wilson's, you know, burden. for two years, he went along like this, and if you fast-forward during that time, the administration was successful in attaining a couple balanced budgets, mainly because of defense cuts, so ike and humphrey considered all the turmoil worthwhile. but when humphrey left office in 1957, he was still unhappy with his inability to cut even more. but toward the end, his poor wife jessie had had enough. here you see a picture coming up of eisenhower and the wilsons, jessie and his wife, and jessie went to a "washington post"
11:09 am
columnist, which she probably shouldn't have done, and she told him, it would be nice if ike would give her husband a slap on the back once in a while. he works seven days a week, she said, and i stood back and listened to criticism until i'm disgusted with it. so this was wilson's unhappy lot, and on the other hand, while my story -- while my book is a story about wilson and his troubles, it's also an account of eisenhower and humphrey as recession fighters, and i'll conclude with a little bit about that. why is it important -- what was it important for eisenhower to worry about a recession? it's easy to forget one of the main concerns of the incoming administration was to prove to the country that the republicans
11:10 am
could handle the economy without falling into a depression, which herbert hoover had done 20 years before. this was really a sensitive issue for them. so the big question always was, how much should the government do during a recession? what kind of action should they take? businessmen like humphrey said, don't do anything because the market will always fix itself without any kind of tampering. besides that, when you do that, you ruin business confidence by, you know, by doing things to indicate that you're worried about the economy. but ike knew this was a sensitive issue, and he kept reassuring the country that he would use the full power of the government in dealing with any economic downturn, which was, of course, what roosevelt had done during the depression.
11:11 am
this was harassing to the business community, especially to humphrey, and so he knew there would be some sort of tension if a recession did rear its ugly head. and, sure enough, it did. the big test came in late 1953 when there was a business slump. it turned into a recession. so the trouble began. and i should point out at this point that there were other players in the economic policymaking besides humphrey and eisenhower. one of them was arthur burns. arthur burns was kind of a -- a very well-known character in administrations to follow. remember, he went on to be nixon's economic advisor, and back then he was -- under eisenhower he was chief of the council of economic advisors.
11:12 am
he was an economist with a specialty in economic forecasting which seemed a perfect fit for ike's concerns. people were worried that burns would come across as too much of what they called the egghead back then, an intellectual. instead eisenhower just really enjoyed burns' presentations to the cabinet, and he learned a lot from them. now, another economic player in this was a guy named gabe hoag. hoag was kind of a white house insider. he had been a speech writer for eisenhower during the campaign, the 1952 presidential campaign. a good friend of ike's by that point, and he was known for giving sound practical advice.
11:13 am
burns and hauge were much more humble than humphrey, and that fact guaranteed some conflict as they tried to figure out what turned out to be a pretty minor recession. in the book i describe in detail the kind of inconclusive and contentious debates that took place. somebody at the cabinet would say, maybe we should do something, start a public works program or recommend some tax cuts. and humphrey would always say, no, no, if we do these things, it will send a message to the business community that we're worried and our worry will be contagious. in these debates eisenhower kind of flipped back and forth, unable to decide really what to do. he took one side and then the other side. but by default, he always seemed to side with humphrey who always advised eisenhower to do
11:14 am
nothing. in the meantime, behind the scenes, humphrey and burns were kind of carrying on a quiet argument. burns wrote later that humphrey would pound the table and raise his voice. he said that he ran a big business and he wasn't going to have professors tell him how to run the treasury department. burns and his staff didn't see running a business as all that relevant, and they called humphrey an economic illiterate. not only illiterate but uneducable. so there was some tension between these guys. burns' successor was a guy named ray saulnier, norman adams and
11:15 am
burns was on the right. but eisenhower said his reactions seemed to be reactive to the mind. it seems odd that they did not make the newspapers, but it was a different era and ike's people were very loyal to him. you didn't have people going outside and talking to the media except maybe the officers that i mentioned. in the end, doing nothing turned out to be a successful course of non-action, because the economy revived and it expanded rapidly, beginning in mid-1954. humphrey felt vindicated, but ike learned the wrong lesson, that doing nothing would always be the right thing to do.
11:16 am
and, of course, a few years later in 1957, there would be a more serious recession, but this was after humphrey had resigned. in the end, ike internalized most of humphrey's advice, and after humphrey left, as treasury secretary, ike appointed an even more conservative treasury secretary. cutting spending continued to be his main weapon. now, eisenhower was always con conflicted about this, because he was a guy who enjoyed being in the middle of the road all the time, and that meant that he always saw both sides of an issue. here's a quote that clearly shows that ike had two minds
11:17 am
about this issue. he said, frankly, i would rather see the congress cut a billion dollars off the defense budget as much as i think it would be a mistake. so he was listening to people who wanted to spend more, he was listening to humphrey, and he was trying hardest to bring the two thoughts together. so let me give you a quick couple of takeaways from my research in the three or four minutes that i have left. eisenhower, i think he paid a price for picking these men to be in his cabinet. wilson was a liability. he couldn't really manage the pentagon. he made unfortunate comments. he monopolized the president's
11:18 am
time. ike never thought about getting rid of wilson. he thought breaking it up would be more harmful than working with the old one, and most importantly, he thought team chemistry was important. he said early in his administration, he took great care in picking this gang and he was very loyal to it. so here we have a picture coming up of eisenhower saying goodbye to wilson, clearly with some affection and with some ambivalence. with regard to humphrey, it was quite different. eisenhower was close to tears when his term ended because they were very close. but i think humphrey's obsession
11:19 am
with inflation and spending had a political price. this is certainly debatable. i should say at this point looking back from the 21st century, this preoccupation with budget balancing and spending seems almost quaint. the u.s. budget deficit last year was over $900 billion, and yet ike and humphrey would agonize about being a few million dollars in the red, which would be a low number by today's standards. but back in the '50s, budget balancing was public orthodoxy, and we can't be too critical around it. still, it can be argued, and i kind of argue this in the book, that the constant pressure to
11:20 am
economize created a climate of addressing social problems, and after the sputnik shock, when the russians put up their satellite in 1957, it raised the question of why america seemed to be falling behind the russians in science and technology. was it because of a lack of investment? this nagging doubt, i think, fed into the election of 1960. the ultimate question was, would a more expansive government policy have led to a nixon victory over kennedy in 1960? kennedy kept arguing that the country had to get moving again, and in some ways eisenhower's spending policies contributed to that perception. and as you know, nixon privately complained to eisenhower about refusing to stimulate the economy in a presidential
11:21 am
election year. so the thing is, everybody was very loyal to eisenhower, and the final takeaway that i have from this doing the research is i rarely saw a criticism of eisenhower in the press. both wilson and eisenhower were strongly committed to a presidency they both admired. i don't know if we've seen the picture of eisenhower's birthday party, but everybody came together on occasions like this to honor their president, and here you see -- richard nixon,
11:22 am
john foster dulles behind, and eisenhower accepting this present and charles wilson on the right. they loved eisenhower. they were loyal to him and they were committed to his success, and i think that speaks volumes about eisenhower, the kind of president he was, his ability to evaluate and motivate people and his ability to make practical decisions based on the needs of the moment rather than on some kind of idealogy. so there i think i'll stop. i may have gone on too long. i'll see if there are any questions. >> thank you, jim. we're going to give everyone a moment to think about what they might like to ask, but i'll start it off just to give people
11:23 am
a little time. you didn't mention anything about eisenhower's expenditures on the st. lawrence seaway or the interstate system. how do those massive projects roll into this financial conservatism that you mentioned earlier? >> that's interesting, the st. lawrence seaway was a big deal early in the administration. and humphrey -- it's interesting, humphrey had a business interest in seeing the seaway built. because he had a contract to ship iron ore from one end of the st. lawrence seaway as it was projected to the other. so he was trying to lobby eisenhower to build it, but at the same time not become too obvious about it. but, yeah, the st. lawrence seaway was an issue early in the
11:24 am
administration. of course, it wasn't completed until much later, but it didn't become a big spending issue, as i understand it. and the other issue you mentioned was -- >> interstate. >> -- the interstate thing. the interstate system, interestingly, humphrey was a big supporter of it, and the reason was it could be done primarily off budget. it was not a budget item. they decided to finance the interstate system through highway taxes, so the whole thing got built, or most of it got built without really making a dent in the budget. so for that reason, people like humphrey could really get behind it. >> thank you for that. >> sure. >> okay, so if anyone would like to offer a question, turn your microphone off of mute from the white bar at the bottom of your screen. i'm going to change my screen so
11:25 am
i can see everybody. i'm sure we have some questions in here. anyone? we're all shy today, jim. >> i may have to talk more about the cia. >> okay. let's do. >> it's interesting, to work at the cia, i feel almost bad today because that kind of job is fast disappearing, the kind of job where you go into one line of work and you stay there, you know, for your entire career. that just doesn't happen any longer. it's sort of like -- the cia, at least, was kind of joining a big family of security measures and doors that were vaults and, you
11:26 am
know, classified material everywhere and precautions of various kinds. it was really kind of a wonderful world. i feel very lucky to have worked in an environment where -- you know, where your longevity was kind of assured. you could stay there as long as you wanted and have a number of different kinds of jobs, a lot of variety with a 30-year career. and i think the only kinds of careers where that's still possible is in government, primarily federal government, and maybe even less often there. >> that's true, we have a handful of employees who have been here for their whole careers. some are listening right now. we did get a question in the chat box. gordon asks, how about the mean of ike's speech statement
11:27 am
military industrial complex? many different opinions on that. what is yours? >> you know, i forgot to mention that. i think eisenhower's experience is frustration with the military budget led directly to his industrial military complex comment. he saw the military, throughout his term, as kind of standing in the way, kind of wielding its power to stand in the way of budget cuts. and this made him very frustrated, and i think it led directly to his military industrial complex comment. he saw how hard it was to prevent the military from lobbying the public for greater expenditures, and then, of
11:28 am
course, as the defense industry accumulated power, more and more things were being contracted out to different companies around the country, and they all had a vested interest in increased budgets as well. so i think he correctly saw the military industrial complex as something to be warned against, and i think time showed that he was right. >> thank you. do we have any other questions? jim, why don't you tell us how to get your book. >> yeah. of course, the easy way would be on amazon. amazon is selling all three of my books. my publisher is mcfarland, and their website is
11:29 am but like i say, amazon is the easier way to get them. my website, which is currently being shown on the screen, is called and on the website, i don't have any information about the eisenhower book yet because it's fairly recent, but it tells you a bit about me and a bit about my approach to history and something about my background at the cia. and a summary of my first two books, the one on nixon that i mentioned that you're kind of looking at right now, and the one right below it on a depression era governor of california named james rolfe, which i assume most of your audiences would not be greatly interested in. but the common element in all of these books is that the people i
11:30 am
choose to work on and with have personalities that fed into their politics and their leadership styles, sometimes their insecurities, and you had to focus on more than just what they said, what their idealogies were. you had focus on what kind of people they were. and each of the people i write about kind of meets that criterion. >> i'm sure once we reopen, we'll have your book in our gift shop. >> oh, good, i hope so. >> that will be another opportunity. weeknights this month, we're featuring american history tv programs as a preview of what's available every weekend on c-span3. tonight we look at the cherokee nation. in the 1830s under president andrew jackson, the cherokees were forcibly removed from their
11:31 am
lands in the southeastern u.s. in what would be known as the trail of tears. lindsay robertson discusses the decisions issued by the supreme court in cases involving the cherokee nation, especially the role of chief justice john marshall. watch tonight beginning at 8:00 p.m. eastern and enjoy american history tv every weekend on c-span3. american history tv on c-span3. every weekend documenting america's story. funding for american history tv comes from these companies who support c-span3 as a public service.
11:32 am go there and order a book on bios and committee assignments. also a book on governors and the biden administration cabinet. every c span's purchase helps expand the nonprofit operation. now, lincoln and congress talks about the congress of 1862 and its promise to have secretary of state william seward replaced. from the american institute and ford theater society, this is about 45 minutes. >> i'm proud to announce our next speaker, dr. william harris. he is a native of alabama and earned his b.a. degree at alabama in 1954. he remembers seeing


info Stream Only

Uploaded by TV Archive on