The Luftwaffe of 1940 is analyzed by examining the strategic and operational connection in the Battle of Britain. The United States Air Force (USAF) of 1991 is analyzed by examining the strategic and operational connection indicated by the composite wing organizational initiative and the shrinking force structure. The Luftwaffe had to secure air superiority from Britain to make an invasion of Britain possible. The Luftwaffe lost the Battle of Britain because it was organized, trained, and equipped to fight an operational was of Blitzkrieg and not the type of air warfare required to gain and maintain air superiority over Britain. The composite wing organization of the USAF may produce better close air support operational capability by tieing USAF units closely to US Army units. It may sacrifice the theater commander's ability to attain his strategic goals by employing air assets in mass to gain air superiority at the start of a conflict. The shrinking USAF force structure may limit the ability of the USAF to drop large conventional bomb loads on area targets. USAF leaders should review USAF plans and programs in light of these case studies to insure the USAF retains and improves its ability to fight operationally for achieving strategic goals and not just to fight operationally.
